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Abstract 6 
Background: The term “financial medicine” refers to the delivery of health-related services where 7 
the generation of financial gain or “profit” takes precedence over the provision of care that is 8 
reflective of evidence-based best practice. The practicing of financial medicine includes over-9 
servicing and overbilling, both of which have led to a sharp rise in the cost of health care and 10 
medical insurance in South Africa. For this reason, the practicing of financial medicine has been 11 
widely condemned both internationally and locally by the Health Professions Council of South 12 
Africa (HPCSA) and allied Professional bodies.  13 
Objectives: This qualitative pilot study explored and described the experiences of South 14 
African Paramedics with regard to the practicing of financial medicine in the local pre-hospital 15 
emergency care environment.   16 
Method: A sample of South African Paramedics were interviewed either face-to-face or 17 
telephonically. The interviews were audio recorded and transcripts produced. Content analysis 18 
was conducted to explore, document and describe the participants’ experiences with regard to 19 
financial medicine practices in the local pre-hospital environment.   20 
Results: It emerged that that all of the participants had experienced a number of financial 21 
medicine practices and associated unethical conduct. Examples included Over-servicing, 22 
Selective Patient Treatment, Fraudulent Billing Practices, Eliciting of kickbacks, incentives or 23 
benefits and Deliberate Time Wasting.  24 
Conclusion: The results of this study are concerning as the actions of service providers 25 
described by the participants constitute gross violations of the ethical and professional 26 
guidelines for health care professionals.  The author recommends further studies be conducted 27 
to further explore these findings and to establish the reasons for, and ways of, limiting financial 28 
medicine practices in the South African emergency care profession. 29 
 30 
 31 
 32 
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Opsomming 33 
Agtergrond: Die term “finansiële medisyne” verwys na die lewering van gesondheids-34 
verwante dienste waar die skep van finansiële gewin voorkeur geniet bo die lewering van sorg 35 
soos vereis word deur bewys gebaseerde praktyk. Die be-oefening van finansiële medisyne sluit 36 
oor-verskaffing van dienste en oor-fakturering in, wat beide lei tot ‘n skerp styging in 37 
gesondheidsorg kostes en mediese versekering in Suid Afrika. As gevolg van hierdie rede word 38 
die be-oefening van finansiële medisyne wyd gekritiseer, beide internasionaal en nasionaal 39 
deur die “Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA)” en verwante professionele 40 
rade. 41 
Doel: Hierdie ondersoekende studie poog om die ondervindinge van Suid Afrikaanse 42 
Paramedisie te verken en te beskryf met betrekking tot die gebruik van finansiële medisyne in 43 
die plaaslike pre hospitalisasie noodgeval omgewing. 44 
Metode: Ses Suid Afrikaanse Paramedisie is ondervra om hul ondervindings te ondersoek, te 45 
dokumenteer en te beskryf met betrekking tot die praktyk van finansiële medisyne in die 46 
plaaslike voor-hospitaal omgewing 47 
Resultate: Dit blyk dat al die deelnemers ‘n aantal finansiële medisyne praktyke ervaar het 48 
asook geassosieërde onetiese gedrag. Voorbeelde sluit in: oor-dienslewering; selektiewe pasiënt 49 
behandeling, bedrog ten opsigte van eise, aanduiding van onwettige winsbetaling of 50 
winsdeling, aansporing of voordele en doelbewuste mors van tyd. 51 
Gevolgtrekking: Die uitslag van hierdie studie is kommerwekkend omdat die aksies van die 52 
diensverskaffers soos beskryf is deur die deelnemers dui op growwe oortredings van die etiese 53 
en professionele riglyne vir die professie. Die outeur beveel verdere addisionele studies aan vir 54 
uitbreiding van hierdie bevindinge en om die redes vir en maniere van finansiële medisyne 55 
praktyke in die plaaslike noodsorg professie te beperk.  56 
 57 
 58 
Introduction 59 
 Practice as a health care professional is premised upon a relationship of mutual trust between 60 
patients and health care practitioners.  In essence, practice as a health care professional is a 61 
moral enterprise (HPCSA 2007).   62 
 63 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) requires registered persons to 64 
consistently act in the best interests of their patients (HPCSA 2007). Ethical guidelines of the 65 
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HPCSA highlight the importance of practitioners avoiding potential conflicts of interest by 66 
maintaining professional autonomy and independence (HPCSA 2007).  The ability and desire to 67 
generate profit is naturally central to the activities of private health care providers, for without 68 
this they would be unable to exist.  The very concept of making money from ill or injured 69 
persons when they are at their most vulnerable continues to pose a philosophical ethical 70 
dilemma.  Registered professionals employed in the private health sector may therefore at times 71 
experience moral dilemmas and potential conflicts of interest. Some of these are brought about 72 
by incentives or forms of inducement that threaten their autonomy, independence or 73 
commitment to professional conduct which should place the patients’ needs ahead of the 74 
expectation to generate profit.    75 
 76 
In the context of this article, the term “Financial Medicine” is used to refer to the delivery of a 77 
health-related service and or the performance of medical interventions where the generation of 78 
financial gain or profit is viewed as the central focus of the providers of the activities and not 79 
necessarily the patient’s wellbeing.   80 
 81 
The practising of financial medicine may include a number of potentially unethical actions with 82 
“Over-servicing” being one. Over servicing involves the provision of unnecessary treatments 83 
and or procedures, either diagnostic and or curative, which are not informed by recognised 84 
treatment protocols.  Those engaged in over-servicing more often than not fail to take into 85 
account the financial and health interests of the patient (HPCSA 2007).   86 
 87 
Background 88 
 89 
In the local pre-hospital emergency care environment, patients are billed according to the level 90 
of care they have received.  Levels of care are divided into three broad categories. These are  91 
Basic Life Support (BLS), Intermediate life Support (ILS) or Advanced Life Support (ALS).   92 
 93 
The Basic Life Support scope of practice includes mostly simple non-invasive interventions, 94 
such as spinal immobilization; administration of oxygen, entonox, and oral glucose; basic 95 
wound care and splinting fractures (Professional Board for Emergency Care 2006a).   96 
 97 
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Intermediate Life Support (ILS) sees the introduction of a couple of additional procedures, such 98 
as the siting of IV lines; needle thoracentesis; needle crichothyrodotomy; use of a 3-lead ECG; 99 
defibrillation and administration of selected drugs such as dextrose, beta 2 stimulants, 100 
ipratropium bromide and aspirin (Professional Board for Emergency Care 2006b).     101 
 102 
Advanced Life Support (ALS) includes advanced airway management (oral tracheal intubation, 103 
nasal tracheal intubation, supraglottic airway placement and surgical crichothyrodotomy). In 104 
addition, there are a number of emergency medications that may be administered by ALS 105 
providers (Professional Board for Emergency Care 2006c).       106 
 107 
The cost of each category of service provided varies with BLS being the least expensive 108 
followed by ILS and then ALS.  This system of costing appears to be open to abuse. Anecdotal 109 
reports by members of the profession have highlighted circumstances, situations and practices 110 
whereby patients who only require a BLS level of care end up receiving unnecessary ILS or ALS 111 
procedures or interventions for the sole purpose of elevating the category of service provided 112 
thereby allowing the service provider to bill at a higher rate.    113 
  114 
Furthermore, informal conversations with members of the profession appear to support claims 115 
that certain private EMS providers in South Africa have been setting their operational 116 
paramedics “targets” or “quotas” that require them to see a minimum set number of ALS 117 
patients each month.  Naturally, those patients who have medical insurance are most sought 118 
after, for recovery of costs from indigent patients who do not have the financial means to pay 119 
for transportation and care becomes difficult. Due to the nature of the emergency care industry, 120 
accurately predicting the nature and volume of calls is difficult, therefore the achievement of set 121 
targets and quotas becomes a challenge.  The pressure to meet targets has allegedly lead certain 122 
paramedics to unnecessarily “upgrade” their patients’ priority and associated level of care 123 
provided for purposes of reporting and billing.       124 
 125 
Whilst the above examples describe practices which are clearly ethically undesirable and 126 
unprofessional much of the above could rightfully be considered untested, anecdotal and 127 
undocumented hearsay.  For this reason it was decided to conduct an exploratory pilot study to 128 
formally investigate, explore and documenting the experiences (if any) of South African 129 
Paramedics with regard to financial medicine practices of emergency service providers. 130 
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 132 
Research Design and Methodology   133 
 134 
Aim 135 
 136 
This pilot study describes the experiences of South African Paramedics with regard to the 137 
practicing of financial medicine in the local pre-hospital emergency care environment.   138 
 139 
Design 140 
 141 
A prospective qualitative design was used. In qualitative research, the researcher collects 142 
information from people who are most knowledgeable about the situation or culture, 143 
commonly referred to as ‘key informants’. (Higginbottom GM, Pillay JJ, Boadu NY. 2013).  In 144 
this study the key informants were the paramedic participants who agreed to be interviewed.     145 
 146 
Data collection 147 
 148 
Six purposefully selected South African Advanced Life Support paramedics were interviewed 149 
in order to explore, document and describe their experiences with regard to financial medicine 150 
practices in the pre-hospital environment.  Following ethical approval, participants who had 151 
consented to being interviewed were contacted either via email or telephone and an appropriate 152 
date, time and place was decided upon where the interview could take place. To ensure 153 
participants could freely express themselves one-on-one interviews were conducted either by 154 
telephone or via face-to-face meetings. The interviews were audio recorded and then 155 
transcribed.  Reflective field notes were also taken during and after each interview.  The 156 
interviews began with a single open question “Can you share with me any experiences you have 157 
had with regard to the practicing of financial medicine in the emergency care environment”. 158 
Each participant then had the opportunity to describe and discuss their experiences; follow-on 159 
probing questions were asked as appropriate.   Six interviews were conducted, two were done 160 
face-to-face and four were done telephonically.  The interviews were conducted in the office of 161 
the Author at the University of Johannesburg Doornfontein Campus, privacy and anonymity 162 
was upheld at all times. 163 
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 164 
 165 
Data analysis 166 
 167 
Transcripts from the interviews were read through thoroughly line by line. Through simple 168 
content analysis the emerging experiences, ideas and concepts linked to the central aims and 169 
objectives of the study were documented.  By end of the sixth interview data saturation 170 
occurred and no new experiences, ideas or concepts were seen to be emerging. Following this 171 
documented experiences and ideas stemming from each of the interviews were coded allowing 172 
them to be grouped together to derive eight common themes and ideas central to the study 173 
(Chenail 2012).  174 
 175 
Trustworthiness 176 
 177 
Rigour of research was ensured by applying measures to ensure trustworthiness such as 178 
strategies of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (De Vos, Strydom, 179 
Fouche & Delport, 2011: 142-143). Credibility was ensured by the researcher’s prolonged 180 
engagement with the field, triangulation of research methods, peer evaluation and in-depth 181 
interviews. Transferability was ensured by providing an in depth description of the 182 
demographics of the participants and a rich description of the results with supporting direct 183 
quotations of the participants. Dependability was ensured by a dense description of the 184 
research methodology, code-recode procedure and step-wise replication of the interviews. 185 
Confirmability was ensured in that the interviews were audio recorded and transcripts 186 
produced which were electronically stored with field notes thereby providing a chain of 187 
evidence in the research process. 188 
 189 
Ethical Considerations  190 
 191 
Ethical approval for the study was granted by the higher degrees and ethics committee of the 192 
University of Johannesburg. Rights to privacy, self-determination, personal liberty and natural 193 
justice are of particular importance when conducting research involving human participants.  194 
As such, there is a responsibility to follow procedures for valid consent, confidentiality, 195 
anonymity, fair treatment and due process that is consistent with those rights (Brikci & Green 196 
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2007). For this reason, service providers and individuals are not named.  All participants were 197 
informed about the background, purpose and aim of the study beforehand and each had the 198 
right to decide whether or not to participate and or to withdraw at any time without any 199 
repercussions.   200 
 201 
 202 
 203 
Findings 204 
 205 
Analysis of the participants responses lead to the identification of the following themes and 206 
ideas:  207 
 208 
a) The “Upgrading” of calls through the performance of unnecessary medical interventions  209 
b) Pressure to meet set Quota’s and Targets 210 
c) Selective Treatment and Patient Care 211 
d) Unprofessional Competitive Conduct 212 
e) Incorrect Billing  213 
f) Overloading of ambulances 214 
g) Unethical kickbacks, benefits or perverse incentives 215 
h) Deliberate Time Wasting 216 
 217 
Each of the above themes and findings are described in more detail below. 218 
 219 
The “Upgrading” of calls through the performance of unnecessary medical interventions  220 
 221 
Of the six participants interviewed, five had experienced a number of situations where calls 222 
were falsely “upgraded”.  By “upgraded” the researcher means that the patient is deliberately 223 
“over-treated”. In the context of this study “over-treatment” refers to instances where patients 224 
receive care and or medical interventions which are not clinically indicated.  Participant’s 225 
responses highlight that unnecessary medical procedures and interventions are being initiated 226 
for the sole purpose of upgrading the category of the call i.e. from Basic to either Intermediate 227 
or Advanced Life Support, or from Intermediate to Advanced Life Support (ALS).  Much of this 228 
upgrading seems to be achieved through the unnecessary placement of an IV line for patients 229 
8 
 
who only required a Basic Life Support (BLS) level of care. This is because the simple act of IV 230 
cannulation immediately changes the category of the call from Basic to Intermediate Life 231 
Support (ILS) allowing the service provider to bill at the higher rate.   232 
 233 
“… it would be upgraded to ILS, ALS, um whether it’s an IV line, or something 234 
being given and when you know it’s not an ALS call, and there is an IV inserted on 235 
the patient just for the fun of it..” 236 
 237 
“..you go to hospital, find the patient’s got an IV line up, got Morphine on board, 238 
and you’ve given them strict instructions to tell them there’s nothing wrong with 239 
the patient..” 240 
 241 
Similarly, in order to upgrade the category of the call to the ALS level a drug such as Morphine 242 
(only available on ALS protocol) would be unnecessarily administered. 243 
   244 
 “..So you land up over-treating patients, so patients that don’t necessarily need 245 
morphine, you’re giving them too..”  246 
 247 
“…nothing else was wrong with them and they would get 15 mg of morphine just to 248 
make it an ALS call”  249 
 250 
“…I.V. lines were sited or miniscule amounts of morphine were given to patients to 251 
escalate the call from either a BLS call to a ILS, or an ILS call to an ALS call”  252 
 253 
 254 
Pressure to meet set Quota’s and Targets 255 
 256 
For private EMS service providers to cover costs and make a profit a minimum call volume or 257 
case load is required.  It would appear that certain private EMS service providers are setting 258 
their operational paramedics targets or quota’s relating to nature and number of calls they 259 
service each month.   260 
 261 
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These targets appear to put their paramedics under pressure and they are thus more inclined to 262 
try and “upgrade” calls in order to achieve their set targets. 263 
 264 
“…what they have for their BLS providers, ILS Providers, and ALS Providers, is they have 265 
a certain quota or statistic that they must meet per month ...  there was a lot of, um, 266 
pressure from the area manager to get those statistics per month”  267 
 268 
“…an ALS have to perform 15 ALS, 15 billable ALS procedures per month.”  269 
 270 
One participant actually went so far as to mention that due to pressure from their employer 271 
they had become personally been involved in financial medicine practices, this had in turn lead 272 
to feelings of shame and negativity.. 273 
 274 
“…it made me very negative and conflicted… I was practising medicine I didn’t believe in, 275 
and that’s not why I got into this industry”  276 
 277 
Selective Treatment and Patient Care 278 
 279 
Participants indicate that private patients who have medical insurance are being treated 280 
differently from public or indigent patients who are not on a medical aid. A form of selective 281 
care or triage appears to be occurring at the scene of particularly motor vehicle accidents based 282 
on the presence of a medical aid.  283 
 284 
“on motor vehicle accidents when there’s multiple patient’s, there’s a selective category 285 
of literally who’s on medical aid, who’s not…”  286 
 287 
It appears that patients who have no medical aid are either ignored completely in preference for 288 
private patients, or they are under-treated to limit the potential loss of income should they be 289 
unable to pay.   290 
 291 
“…patients that are not on medical aid and that will be under treated; they don’t really 292 
receive what they’re supposed too”  293 
 294 
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Services providers often do not know until they arrive on scene if the victims of a motor vehicle 295 
accident are on a medical aid or not. It seems that in cases where two or more private 296 
ambulance service arrive at the same incident both will attempt to avoid having to transport the 297 
patients who do not have medical insurance. 298 
 299 
“…between the private services, there was a lot of um competition, in the fact that, you 300 
know smaller service would get to a scene, and say well  “you know what this patient 301 
doesn’t have medical aid so we’re not gonna bill them so you can transport them.”  302 
 303 
In addition to the above, a number of questionable competitive practices were mentioned linked 304 
to service providers desires to canvas medical aid patients from accident scenes. 305 
 306 
These include using a tow truck to arrive on scene first to “Scan” for billable (medical aid) 307 
patients and then “Claiming” these patients. The way this apparently works is that a vehicle 308 
(sometimes a tow-truck) with a Basic Life Support provider on board is sent to scout out 309 
accident scenes and find out if any of the patients on scene are on a medical aid.  Based on this 310 
information decisions are being made relating to further response and or interventions. 311 
 312 
 313 
“ they send a car through and assess the patients… the purpose of this vehicle is if you 314 
have medical aid then we’ll send our ambulance, if you don’t then ok we’ll stay here 315 
and treat and wait for another ambulance service”  316 
 317 
“…where a tow truck driver would phone them after scanning if the patient is on 318 
medical aid or not and if they don’t [have medical aid] then they withhold the call…”  319 
 320 
“They quickly scout for the medical aid patients, if there is no medical aid patients they 321 
stand the vehicle, the ambulances down.”  322 
 323 
 324 
Unprofessional Competitive Conduct 325 
 326 
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Multiple service providers all operating in the same area competing for calls appears to be 327 
leading to incidents of unprofessional conduct and conflict particularly at accident scenes. 328 
Participants indicate that there are times when an ambulance may already be on scene, ready 329 
and available to transport the injured party. However the ambulance is not from the service the 330 
first responder works for they refuse to allow the patient to be loaded and transported. Patients 331 
are therefore unnecessarily being delayed at the scene of the incident until an ambulance from 332 
the first responders service arrives. 333 
 334 
 “… we’ll arrive on scene they would say: “this is my patient”; “ok great no problem but 335 
we have an ambulance here so we’re gonna take the patient” “No, no you’re not allowed 336 
too”; and that’s what happens..” 337 
 338 
 “…it’s literally almost like tag, it’s like who can run around with the BP cuff or spine board 339 
or something and [claim patients]..” 340 
 341 
“…you physically see people pulling each other off patients”?  342 
 343 
“I’ve actually seen patients stolen out of other services ambulances”  344 
 345 
 346 
Incorrect Billing  347 
 348 
Several of the participants shared experiences relating to deliberate incorrect or inappropriate 349 
billing. These included billing at a higher category than the call was actually serviced. For 350 
example a patient received no medical interventions aside from BLS assessment and monitoring 351 
and yet they end up being billed for an ILS call.   352 
 353 
“…charged, for example ILS rates, yet the service that is rendered is a basic life support 354 
level.”  355 
 356 
Another theme that emerged was the fraudulent use of another ALS paramedic’s name and 357 
HPCSA registration number on patient care records and associated paperwork to bill at an ALS 358 
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rate yet this paramedic was never on scene, did not treat the patient and in some instance do 359 
not even work for the service provider concerned. 360 
 361 
“And some of these services don’t even have advanced life support, where they would utilise 362 
someone’s details who is not even in their services”  363 
 364 
The contracting of service providers to provide medical cover (standby) at sports events and 365 
other mass gatherings is common.  Inability and ignorance of event organisers to properly 366 
differentiate between levels of pre-hospital qualifications, care and associated equipment 367 
provision appears to be creating an opportunity for certain service providers to bill them at an 368 
ALS rate whilst in reality they only provide personnel and or equipment for a BLS level of care.  369 
 370 
“Working at an events company, where they started off as a contract…So, the contract 371 
would stipulate ALS, and they have a BLS working for the day.. 372 
 373 
 374 
Overloading of ambulances 375 
 376 
Participants described situations where multiple patients are crammed into a single ambulance 377 
each patient being billed for levels of care that would have been physically impossible to 378 
provide considering the number of crew and limited space. 379 
 380 
“So they’re billing the medical aid and then they’re transporting 5, 6, 7, 8 patients in an 381 
ambulance and they’re billing for 8 patients”  382 
 383 
“…you arrive on a scene and another company has arrived before and they’ve literally 384 
loaded 10 or 15 patients into the back of an ambulance” 385 
 386 
“ They’ve stacked all of them like little sardines inside the ambulance just to claim all the 387 
medical aid…”  388 
 389 
 390 
Unethical kickbacks, benefits or perverse incentives 391 
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 392 
A number of potentially questionable practices relating to “arrangements” between ambulance 393 
services call centres and other parties for purposes of canvassing were mentioned. 394 
 395 
“… arrangements are made behind the scenes to benefit one service over another 396 
service… people are chasing calls and people are actually paying people to scan the 397 
radios to receive the calls…” 398 
 399 
 400 
“…it’s not just the control room, um I would put it onto private, provincial services, all 401 
the services, whether it be from a tow truck an undertaker or phoning their friends, um 402 
there’s services out there where a tow truck driver would phone them after scanning if 403 
the patient is on medical aid or not “ 404 
 405 
 406 
One participant explained how they had seen incidences where private service providers have 407 
been contracted to perform ALS transfers of critically ill patients from one medical facility to the 408 
next despite the fact that they do not have any staff ALS to do the call. What apparently 409 
happens in this situation is that another ALS paramedic working for the public service is 410 
contacted to accompany the patient although he is on duty. 411 
 412 
“So they’re working for [name of public service removed] they’re being paid full time salary 413 
and then a private company phones and you know says “ag just, you’re on shift bring the 414 
response car (and) do the transfer for us quickly, we’ll give you a thousand rand cash”.  415 
Because they’re getting 5, 6 grand cash for the transfer, and the ALS don’t mind cause it’s a 416 
little more extra cash on their side” 417 
 418 
 419 
 420 
 421 
  422 
Deliberate Time Wasting 423 
 424 
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Aside from level of care or category of call, patients are also billed according to the duration of 425 
time that they were in the care of the service provider. This time starts on arrival at scene and 426 
continues until the patient is handed over to the hospital staff at the receiving facility. It would 427 
seem that time wasting practises are being instituted by some service providers in order to 428 
inflate the amount that can be billed. 429 
 430 
“… we’re saying to the guys you’re wasting time on scene, cause time is money... they bill per 431 
hour”  432 
 433 
“we’re taking a 5 minute call [on scene time and then driving to hospital] to a 25-30 minute 434 
call.”  435 
 436 
 437 
Discussion 438 
 439 
Financial Medicine practises have little benefit for the patient, and rather only serve to benefit 440 
the service provider (Clemens & Gottlieb 2012, Biller-Adorno & Lee 2013). Having said this 441 
there is little published literature describing such financial medicine practices within the South 442 
African pre-hospital emergency care environment. Although ethical purists may claim that 443 
generation of profit from the misfortunes of others may be unpalatable, in the real world the 444 
ability to generate profit is central to the continued operation of any private enterprise 445 
including ambulance services. For this reason, those engaging in private health care should not 446 
be unfairly criticised or judged for attempting to make a profit. It is also common knowledge 447 
that the current health needs of the South African population cannot be adequately catered for 448 
by our existing public health care system alone. This is especially true in the local pre-hospital 449 
emergency care environment where without the involvement of the ever expanding private 450 
sector many ill or injured patients would not be timeously attended to. A number of private 451 
ambulance services in South Africa have a good history of social consciences and continue to 452 
provide high levels of care to public and private patients alike despite the fact that they often 453 
have to write off associated costs which cannot be recovered. Having said this, the results of this 454 
study are concerning as many of the actions of service providers and their registered 455 
practitioners as described by the participants clearly constitute gross violations of the ethical 456 
and professional guidelines for registered health care professionals. A deeper understanding 457 
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needs to be developed about why financial medicine practices are occurring and why they 458 
continue to go unchallenged.   459 
 460 
Implications 461 
 462 
The cost of medical insurance and private health care in South African continues to be a concern 463 
for the national department of health and the practicing of financial medicine is one of the 464 
factors driving this increase. What little legislation there is relating to the establishment and 465 
operation of ambulance services in South Africa is clearly not being properly policed and 466 
enforced.  Whilst other countries have a system where licences to operate are restricted to a 467 
single service provider per population and or geographical area, in South Africa it seems to be a 468 
complete “free for all” at the moment. 469 
 470 
Although the HPCSA provide guidelines for ethical practice, some of which speak directly to 471 
matters of over servicing and perverse incentives (HPCSA 2007), the results of this pilot study 472 
appear to indicate that these guidelines are not being followed.  473 
 474 
The emergency care profession as a whole are also in part responsible for the continuation of 475 
financial medicine practices which serve to cheapen the name and good standing of the 476 
profession.  This being the case it remains unclear at this point why it is that the unethical 477 
actions of registered persons, as described by the participants in this study, continue to go 478 
unreported to the HPCSA.  479 
 480 
Limitations 481 
 482 
One limitation was that prior to this study there was a lack of previously published local 483 
literature on this topic.  484 
 485 
Recommendations 486 
 487 
Going forward statutory bodies, regulators and administrators need to take note of the findings 488 
of this study and consider ways of better regulating and policing the private ambulance sector 489 
in South Africa in order to better protect the public from financial medicine practices. This pilot 490 
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study needs to be followed by further research focused to determine if any other financial 491 
medicine practises are occurring and also to try and quantitatively determine the prevalence 492 
and impact of the practices described in this pilot study.  493 
 494 
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